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TWO CRIMES FOR THE PRICE OF ONE: RESHAPING
FELONY HOMICIDE IN STATE v. RUSSELL
Eric Henkel*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the core of criminal law rests the basic principle that people should
be responsible for any harm that results from their unlawful actions.'
Whenever a defendant is found criminally liable, the law imposes a penalty.
Usually, courts impose one penalty for every crime committed. Sometimes,
however, it is not that simple. The traditional felony homicide doctrine
holds a felon strictly liable for a death that occurs during the commission of
a felony.2 When a defendant is convicted of felony homicide, it is often
difficult to determine if the defendant should be punished for two crimes-
deliberate homicide and the underlying felony. Prior to the Montana Su-
preme Court's decision in State v. Russell,3 a defendant convicted of felony
homicide could be convicted and punished for the underlying felony and the
resulting homicide.4
In this note, I discuss the Montana Supreme Court's departure from the
conventional view that a defendant convicted of felony homicide could also
be convicted of the predicate felony offense. The note begins with a brief
overview of how felony homicide and predicate felony offenses are concep-
tualized in various jurisdictions, including Montana's conceptualization
prior to Russell. Then, the Russell opinion is discussed. In the opinion, the
majority concludes that "in the unique context of felony homicide, the pred-
icate offense is, of necessity, an included offense, as well as an element of
the felony homicide itself."5 Essentially, the majority's holding implied
that no set of circumstances could exist whereby a defendant charged with
felony homicide could also be charged with the predicate felony. Further-
more, the majority opinion inexcusably ignores the well-established rule
that requires predicate felonies to be causally connected to a homicide in
order for the felony homicide doctrine to apply. Finally, I conclude with an
* Eric Henkel, canidate for J.D. 2011, The University of Montana School of Law. The author
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Henkel, Kevin Donahoe, Mark Henkel, Kelly Devlin, and Sherry Devlin for all of their support. The
author offers additional thanks to all members of the Montana Law Review for their invaluable advice
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1. Guyora Binder, The Origins ofAmerican Felony Murder Rules, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 59, 73 (2004).
2. Id. at 60.
3. State v. Russell, 198 P.3d 271 (Mont. 2008).
4. State v. Close, 623 P.2d 940, 950 (Mont. 1981).
5. Russell, 198 P.3d at 274.
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analysis and critique of the majority's reasoning in Russell for departing
from a longstanding precedent.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FELONY HOMICIDE AND PREDICATE
FELONY OFFENSES
The felony homicide doctrine is interpreted and applied differently in
many jurisdictions throughout the United States. For example, some juris-
dictions only apply the felony homicide doctrine when the underlying fel-
ony is "so distinct from the homicide so as not to be an ingredient thereof." 6
Under this approach, the felony homicide doctrine is inapplicable if the act
causing the underlying felony is the same act that causes a victim's death.7
This approach is often referred to as the "merger doctrine" because the un-
derlying felony, if not distinct, merges into the homicide.8 Jurisdictions
adopting this approach reason that every murder is preceded by an assault,
and, thus, without the merger doctrine every homicide would fall under the
felony homicide doctrine. 9
Some jurisdictions subscribing to the merger doctrine enumerate cer-
tain felonies that "do not merge with the homicide so as to preclude a
charge of felony murder."' 0 Thus, if a statute enumerates aggravated as-
sault as an underlying offense, then any death caused during the commis-
sion of an aggravated assault appropriately falls under the felony homicide
doctrine. Generally, jurisdictions do not have difficulty classifying predi-
cate felonies or determining when the felony homicide doctrine should ap-
ply."I Instead, problems tend to arise when a defendant is faced with multi-
ple convictions, one for felony homicide and one for the underlying fel-
ony. 12
Many courts prohibit the conviction of underlying felonies in order to
protect a defendant's double jeopardy rights. For example, in Georgia, any
time an underlying felony forms the basis for a felony homicide charge, a
defendant can only be convicted of the felony homicide.13 Other jurisdic-
6. State v. Smallwood, 955 P.2d 1209, 1226 (Kan. 1998).
7. State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2006).
8. Id.
9. Cmmw. v. Kilburn, 780 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (Mass. 2003).
10. 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide § 67 (1999); see e.g. State v. McCann, 907 P.2d 239, 241 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995).
11. See e.g. State v. Mason, 709 N.W.2d 638 (Neb. 2006); Cmmw. v. Burton, 876 N.E.2d 411
(Mass. 2007); People v. Rosenthal, 914 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. App. 2009); State v. Moore, 213 P.3d 150 (Ariz.
2009).
12. See e.g. State v. Arroyo, 931 A.2d 975 (Conn. App. 2007); Quillen v. State, 163 P.3d 587 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2007); People v. Ream, 750 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. 2008); State v. Rudolfo, 187 P.3d 170 (N.M.
2008); Brady v. State, 659 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. 2008).
13. Bolston v. State, 651 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Ga. 2007).
Vol. 71206
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tions, such as North Carolina, allow the conviction of underlying felonies
but limit punishment to the felony homicide conviction. 14 Several jurisdic-
tions follow similar approaches to Georgia and North Carolina.15 The basic
rationale behind these approaches is that the underlying felony should
merge with the felony homicide because it is a lesser included offense in the
felony homicide.' 6
Prior to 2008, a defendant convicted of felony homicide in Montana
could also be convicted and punished for the underlying felony.' 7 In State
v. Close, the Montana Supreme Court reasoned that "the statute proscribing
the underlying felony . . . is designed to protect a wholly different societal
interest from the felony murder statute, which is intended to protect against
homicide."' 8 The majority in Close felt that "[t]he legislature manifested a
clear intention to serve two different interests in enacting the statutes."' 9
Before 2008, the Montana Supreme Court had never encountered a
case that was factually similar to Russell. In Russell, the defendant chal-
lenged the validity of his underlying felony conviction in light of his felony
homicide conviction. 20 However, the factual premise of Russell was unique
because the underlying felony and the felony homicide were committed
against different victims.21 The specific issue in front of the Court was
whether the underlying felony conviction was prohibited by the double
jeopardy clause of the Montana Constitution. 2 2
III. STATE OF MONTANA v. RUSSELL
A. Facts
On April 25, 2005, Rusty Lee-Ray Russell and his friend Brandon
Spotted Wolf spent the evening consuming alcoholic beverages at various
locations throughout Billings, Montana.2 3 Although Russell and Spotted
Wolf were under the legal drinking age, they were able to convince an older
third party to buy them two bottles of whiskey. 24 Russell and Spotted Wolf
proceeded to make their way across Billings, drinking in various back al-
14. State v. Dudley, 566 S.E.2d 843, 847 (N.C. App. 2002).
15. See e.g. State v. Eby, 37 P.3d 625, 631 (Idaho App. 2001); People v. Baugh, 832 N.E.2d 903,
914 (Ill. App. 2005).
16. Eby, 37 P.3d at 631; Dudley, 566 S.E.2d at 847; Baugh, 832 N.E.2d at 914; Bolston, 651 S.E.2d
at 21.
17. Close, 623 P.2d at 951.
18. Id. at 950.
19. Id. at 951.
20. Russell, 198 P.3d at 274.
21. Id. at 273.
22. Id. at 274.
23. Id. at 272.
24. Id.
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leys. 2 5 In the early morning hours of April 26, 2005, the two men met up
with Henry Rideshorse outside of a local thrift store.26 Together, the three
men continued to drink in the alley behind the thrift store.2 7
Behind the thrift store, Russell, Spotted Wolf, and Rideshorse found
several transients sleeping in the alley.28 The three men approached one of
the transients, Dale Wallin, and Spotted Wolf demanded money from him. 2 9
Because Wallin failed to respond to Spotted Wolf s demands, Spotted Wolf
pulled out a knife and used it to slash Wallin's face. 3 0 Spotted Wolf handed
the knife to Russell who proceeded to stab Wallin multiple times in the
back.3 1
After stabbing Wallin, Russell walked further down the alley and ap-
proached another sleeping transient, John Gewanski. 3 2 Russell proceeded
to stab Gewanski multiple times, resulting in Gewanski's death.3 3 After
killing Gewanski, both Russell and Spotted Wolf resumed their attack on
Wallin until Rideshorse intervened and stopped the violent beating.34 After
Russell and Spotted Wolf fled the scene, Wallin made his way to a local
hospital and was able to survive his numerous stab wounds.3 5
The State of Montana charged Russell with multiple offenses including
"the deliberate homicide of Gewanski, the aggravated assault of Wallin,
robbery by accountability, and aggravated assault of Gewanski by accounta-
bility." 36 The State brought the deliberate homicide charge under Montana
Code Annotated § 45-5-102(1)(b), also known as the felony homicide stat-
ute. 3 7 The underlying felony for the felony homicide charge was specifi-
cally identified as the aggravated assault of Wallin.3 8
Before the jury issued a verdict, Russell requested that "the court ...
instruct the jury that, if they convicted Russell of deliberate homicide under
a felony homicide theory, they must all agree on the particular act or acts he
committed."39 The instruction was refused and the jury subsequently re-
25. Id.
26. Russell, 198 P.3d at 274.
27. Id. at 273.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Russell, 198 P.3d at 273.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 273.
38. Russell, 198 P.3d at 273.
39. Id.
208 Vol. 71
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turned a verdict of guilty on all four counts, including the felony homicide
of Gewanski and the aggravated assault of Wallin. 4 0
Before sentencing, Russell requested that the district court dismiss his
conviction for the aggravated assault on Wallin because it violated the
double jeopardy provisions of the Montana Constitution. 4 1 Specifically,
Russell maintained that the conviction placed him in double jeopardy be-
cause the felony homicide of Gewanski was predicated on the aggravated
assault of Wallin.4 2 The district court refused to grant Russell's motion to
dismiss, and he received a separate sentence for each of his convictions.4 3
Russell appealed the district court's decision to the Montana Supreme
Court.
B. Majority Holding
In a divided opinion delivered by Justice Leaphart, the Montana Su-
preme Court reversed the district court's "order denying Russell's motion to
dismiss his conviction for aggravated assault."44 Two justices dissented
from the majority's opinion as it related to the dismissal of the aggravated
assault conviction.4 5 Justice Nelson concurred in part and dissented in part
because, although he agreed with the Court's method of analysis in dis-
missing the aggravated assault conviction, he believed the conviction
should have been affirmed based on an invalid felony homicide convic-
tion.46
The majority held that a defendant convicted of felony homicide can-
not also be convicted of the underlying felony because "[i]n the unique
context of felony homicide, the predicate offense is, of necessity, an in-
cluded offense, as well as an element of the felony homicide itself."47
Thus, the majority concluded that the double jeopardy clause of the Mon-
tana Constitution 4 8 prohibited the conviction and punishment of Russell for
the aggravated assault because the felony homicide conviction was predi-
cated on "the same aggravated assault." 4 9
Although Russell framed the issue on appeal as a constitutional issue,
the majority's reasoning was primarily based on two Montana statutes:
40. Id.
41. Mont. Const. art. II, § 25; Reply Br. Appellant at 1, State v. Russell, 198 P.3d 271 (Mont.
2008).
42. Russell, 198 P.3d at 274.
43. Id. at 273.
44. Id. at 277.
45. Id. at 281-284 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
46. Id. at 278-281 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47. Id. at 274 (majority).
48. Mont. Const. art. II, § 25.
49. Russell, 198 P.3d at 277.
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§§ 46-11-410 and 46-1-202(9).50 The majority began by stating the gen-
eral rule that a defendant can be convicted of multiple offenses whenever
"the same transaction may establish the commission of more than one of-
fense . . . ."s5 However, the exception to this general rule is that "a defen-
dant may not . . . be convicted of more than one offense if one offense is
included in the other."52 Furthermore, "included offense" is defined as any
offense that "is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts
required to establish the commission of the offense charged."5 3 In relation
to included offenses, the Montana Supreme Court previously held that "the
term 'facts' refers to the statutory elements of the offenses, not the individ-
ual facts of the case."5 4
After refraining the issue as statutory rather than constitutional, the
majority applied the highlighted statutes to Russell's facts. Because the
State charged Russell with felony homicide of Gewanski and identified the
aggravated assault of Wallin as the underlying felony, the majority reasoned
that the aggravated assault was a necessary element of the felony homi-
cide.55 Furthermore, because the State used the same evidence "to prove
the stand-alone aggravated assault charge . .. and the predicate felony relied
upon in the felony homicide charge," the majority reasoned that the aggra-
vated assault was an included offense of the felony homicide.56 Therefore,
the majority concluded that Russell could not be convicted of aggravated
assault because it was an included offense as defined by § 46-1-202(9).57
The majority opined that the State could have avoided the merging of
the homicide and assault convictions by identifying the robbery charge as
the predicate felony.58 Additionally, the State could have charged Russell
under the traditional deliberate homicide statute59 instead of the felony
homicide statute.60 According to the majority, either alternative would
have allowed separate convictions for the aggravated assault of Wallin and
the felony homicide of Gewanski. 6 '
50. Id. at 274; Mont. Code Ann. §§ 46-11-410, 46-1-202(9).
51. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-11-410(1).
52. Id. at § 46-11-410(2)(a).
53. Id. at § 46-1-202(9).
54. State v. Beavers, 987 P.2d 371, 377 (Mont. 1999).
55. Russell, 198 P.3d at 274.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 274-275.
58. Id. at 275.
59. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102(1)(a).
60. Russell, 198 P.3d at 275.
61. Id.
210 Vol. 71
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C. Justice Nelson's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Nelson wrote a partially concurring and partially dissenting
opinion in which he agreed with the majority's method of analysis but dis-
agreed with the majority's "ultimate disposition" of the appeal. 62 Specifi-
cally, Justice Nelson contended that the aggravated assault conviction
should have been affirmed because Russell's felony homicide conviction
was invalid.63 According to Justice Nelson, because the felony homicide
conviction was invalid, the Court should not have reached the double jeop-
ardy claim.6"
Justice Nelson argued that "a causal connection between the felonious
act and the death must be present" in order for the felony homicide doctrine
to apply.65 Justice Nelson cited several cases decided by the Montana Su-
preme Court that require a victim's death to be a natural consequence of, or
closely related to, the predicate felony.66 Furthermore, Justice Nelson
stressed that the plain language of Montana's felony homicide statute states
that a victim's death must occur during "the course of' a predicate felony or
the "flight thereafter." 67 Justice Nelson argued that no factual or legal basis
existed to support the contention that Gewanski's death occurred during the
commission of a felony because the initial assault on Wallin was already
over when Gewanski was killed.68 Additionally, Justice Nelson contended
that Gewanski's death did not occur during the "flight" after the predicate
felony because Russell's actions after he assaulted Wallin were not indica-
tive of a fleeing criminal.69 Therefore, because he believed that Russell's
felony homicide conviction was invalid as a matter of law, Justice Nelson
dissented from the majority's overall disposition of the appeal.
D. Justice Rice's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rice wrote a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Gray
joined. Justice Rice disagreed with the majority opinion because (1) it side-
stepped the constitutional issue raised on appeal, and (2) it arbitrarily over-
ruled the longstanding precedent in Montana that a person convicted of fel-
ony homicide could also be convicted of the predicate felony. 70 Justice
62. Id. at 278 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 279.
66. Russell, 198 P.3d at 279-280 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
67. Id. at 279-280; Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102(1)(b).
68. Id. at 279.
69. Id. at 280.
70. Id. at 281-284 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
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Rice argued that the majority failed to recognize that felony homicide is "a
unique creation" and is not subject to general merger provisions.7'
Justice Rice relied heavily on the Montana Supreme Court's decision
in Close7 2 to support his contention that felony homicide is not subject to
general merger provisions.73 In Close, the Court held that the "statute pro-
scribing the underlying felony is designed to protect a wholly different soci-
etal interest from the felony murder statute, which is designed to protect
against homicide." 74 Therefore, Justice Rice argued that any merging of the
underlying felony with the felony homicide charge would ignore the Legis-
lature's intention of using the felony homicide statute to protect two differ-
ent interests.75
Beyond the argument that felony homicide was uniquely designed to
protect multiple interests, Justice Rice criticized the Court for avoiding the
constitutional issue that was actually raised on appeal.76 Russell's original
argument on appeal was that the double jeopardy clause of the Montana
Constitution prohibited his conviction for aggravated assault because his
felony homicide conviction was predicated on the same assault.77 Based on
Russell's actual appeal, Justice Rice argued that the majority's holding was
flawed because it produced "a result disconnected from the facts" of the
case.7 1 Justice Rice reasoned that the basic concept behind double jeopardy
is that "no person should suffer twice for a single act."79 Furthermore, Jus-
tice Rice argued that the factual premise presented in Russell's case showed
that he was not placed in double jeopardy because he committed two sepa-
rate acts against two separate victims-felony homicide of Gewanski and
aggravated assault of Wallin.80 Therefore, Justice Rice dissented from the
majority opinion because he believed that the majority gave Russell a "free
pass" for the aggravated assault of Wallin.8 1
IV. ANALYSIS
In delivering the Russell opinion, the Montana Supreme Court made
two mistakes that produced a holding inconsistent with the facts of the case.
First, the majority's analysis incorrectly classified the aggravated assault of
71. id. at 283.
72. Close, 623 P.2d 940.
73. Russell, 198 P.3d at 282-283 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
74. Close, 623 P.2d at 950-951.
75. Russell, 198 P.3d at 282 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 281.
77. Russell, 198 P.3d at 274.
78. Id. at 284 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
212 Vol. 71
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Wallin as a lesser included offense in the felony homicide of Gewanski. 82
Second, the majority incorrectly assumed "that the assault on Wallin and
the killing of Gewanski were part of the same transaction." 8 3 This assump-
tion caused the majority to overlook an invalid felony homicide conviction.
Consequently, the majority's holding was misleading because it implied
that the double jeopardy clause of the Montana Constitution always prohib-
its the State from convicting a defendant of both felony homicide and the
underlying felony. 84
A. Considering Lesser Included Offenses in Relation to
Felony Homicide
Under Montana law, whenever "the same transaction may establish the
commission of more than one offense, a person charged with the conduct
may be prosecuted for each offense."85 However, one exception to this rule
is that "a defendant may not . . . be convicted of more than one offense if
one offense is included in another."8 6 An offense is included in another
when both offenses can be established by proof of the same elements.8 7 In
State v. Matt, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that assault with a
weapon is not a lesser included offense of assault on a peace officer because
one requires the use of a weapon and the other requires bodily injury to a
peace officer.88 Therefore, the Court held that an offense is not included in
another when each offense requires proof of a different element.89
In order to determine if an offense is included in felony homicide, it
logically follows that a court needs to understand the essential elements of
felony homicide. In Montana, the felony homicide statute states, in perti-
nent part, that a person commits deliberate homicide if the person commits
"robbery, sexual intercourse without consent ... aggravated assault, or any
other forcible felony and in the course of the forcible felony or flight there-
after, the person . . . causes the death of another human being."90 On the
face of this statute, the commission of a forcible felony is clearly an essen-
tial element of felony homicide.91 Therefore, as the majority opinion in
82. Id. at 274 (majority).
83. Russell, 198 P.3d at 275.
84. Id. at 277.
85. Mont. Code Ann. § 46-11-410(1).
86. Id. at § 46-11-410(2)(a).
87. Beavers, 987 P.2d at 377.
88. State v. Matt, 106 P.3d 530, 533 (Mont. 2005).
89. Id.
90. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102(1)(b).
91. Close, 623 P.2d at 951.
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Russell correctly pointed out, "a defendant cannot commit the offense of
felony homicide without committing a predicate felony offense." 92
In Russell, the majority's crucial error occurred when it concluded that
the aggravated assault of Wallin was a lesser included offense in the felony
homicide of Gewanski. 93 Because the commission of a predicate offense is
an element of felony homicide, the majority reasoned that "the predicate
offense is, of necessity, an included offense." 94 Thus, the majority con-
cluded that the double jeopardy clause of the Montana Constitution prohib-
its the State from convicting a defendant of both felony homicide and the
underlying felony. 95 However, this conclusion was inconsistent with Mon-
tana law. In 1999, the Montana Supreme Court stated that "the double
jeopardy clause ... prohibits [the State] from imposing on criminal defend-
ants multiple punishments for the same offense." 96 In Russell's case, the
facts clearly indicate that he committed two separate offenses on two sepa-
rate victims-aggravated assault of Wallin and felony homicide of Gewan-
ski. Therefore, because he was not subjected to multiple punishments for a
single offense, Russell's double jeopardy rights were not violated.
Theoretically, the majority's understanding of double jeopardy was
correct because it was based on the belief that Russell was punished twice
for the same crime. However, the majority's holding came out backwards
because it was "disconnected from the facts of [the] case."97 In his dissent,
Justice Rice correctly argued that the majority overlooked the critical fact
that the predicate felony and the felony homicide produced different vic-
tims. 9 8 Consequently, punishing Russell once for stabbing Wallin and then
killing Gewanski produced a result that "is antithetical to the legal and
moral concepts behind double jeopardy."99
B. Felony Homicide and Causual Connection
Assuming arguendo that the majority was correct in classifying Rus-
sell's predicate felony as an included offense, the Court should never have
reached the issue because Russell's felony homicide conviction was invalid
and should have been vacated. Even though Russell did not challenge his
felony homicide conviction, the Court reserves the power to review any
92. Russell, 198 P.3d at 275.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 274.
95. Id. at 277.
96. State v. Guillaume, 975 P.2d 312, 318 (Mont. 1999).
97. Russell, 198 P.3d at 284 (Rice, J. & Gray, C.J., dissenting).
98. Id
99. Id.
214 Vol. 71
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error that causes "substantial injustice." oo Specifically, the majority incor-
rectly assumed that "the assault on Wallin and the killing of Gewanski were
part of the same transaction."o'0 Consequently, the majority opinion im-
plied that felony homicide is appropriate even when the underlying felony
is not causally connected to the actual homicide.
Under Montana law, a felony homicide occurs when a person "causes
the death of another human being" during "the course of [a] forcible felony
or flight thereafter." 0 2 Additionally, in 1976, the Montana Supreme Court
established that "for the felony-murder rule to apply a causal connection
between the felonious act and the death must be present."10 3 Furthermore,
"the homicide must be so closely connected" to the underlying felony that
there is an "actual legal relation between the killing and the crime commit-
ted."104
A causal connection is an element of felony homicide because it al-
lows a court to infer the defendant's intent to kill. A prosecutor satisfies the
intent element of felony homicide by proving that the defendant acted with
the intent to commit the underlying felony. 0 5 However, the intent to com-
mit the underlying felony will not transfer to the homicide if the prosecu-
tion fails to demonstrate a "causal relationship" between the two crimes. 0 6
The Court has stated that the purpose of the felony homicide doctrine is "to
clothe the felon's act of killing with [intent]" and not "to foist authorship of
a homicide upon [the] felon." 0 7 Thus, this purpose is only satisfied when
the homicide is "a consequence of the felony . . . and not mere coinci-
dence."108
In the Russell opinion, the majority should have recognized that the
causal connection requirement was not satisfied. In his dissent, Justice Nel-
son correctly pointed out that the facts "do not support the proposition that a
causal connection existed between the aggravated assault on Wallin and the
death of Gewanski."l 0 9 The facts clearly demonstrate that no causal con-
nection existed because the assault on Wallin was already over when "Rus-
sell attacked and killed Gewanski."' 10 By failing to acknowledge the griev-
ous flaw in Russell's felony homicide conviction, the majority severely
100. State v. Andersen-Conway, 171 P.3d 678, 680 (Mont. 2007).
101. Russell, 198 P.3d at 275 (majority).
102. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-5-102(1)(b).
103. State ex. rel. Murphy v. McKinnon, 556 P.2d 906, 910 (Mont. 1976).
104. Id.
105. State v. Weinberger, 671 P.2d 567, 568 (Mont. 1983).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 569.
108. Id.
109. Russell, 198 P.3d at 280 (Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id.
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crippled Montana's causal connection requirement. Additionally, it was
"necessary for [the] Court to consider the legal validity of the felony homi-
cide conviction" in order to protect "Russell's fundamental right to due pro-
cess.""' Because the Court failed to address Russell's felony homicide
conviction, the majority's analysis implied that felony homicide is appropri-
ate even when the underlying felony has no causal connection to the homi-
cide.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's decision in Russell drastically changed
the felony homicide doctrine in Montana. The Russell opinion is significant
because it eliminated the possibility of punishing defendants for predicate
felonies. Specifically, the Court incorrectly classified Russell's aggravated
assault on Wallin as an included offense in the felony homicide of Gewan-
ski.11 2 Consequently, Russell was only punished for the felony homicide of
Gewanski and received no punishment for his assault on Wallin. The
Court's holding is significant because it implies that the felony homicide
doctrine is applicable even when the predicate felony has no causal connec-
tion to the actual homicide. The Court overlooked the fact that Russell
committed two separate acts on two different victims-aggravated assault
of Wallin and felony homicide of Gewanski. Ultimately, the Russell opin-
ion reshapes felony homicide in Montana because it eliminates the chance
for multiple punishments, and it ignores the causal connection requirement
for felony homicide.
111. Id. at 279.
112. Id. at 274-275 (majority).
216 Vol. 71
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